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Abstract Emergencies on large passenger ships in the remote High North may lead 
to a mass rescue operation with a heavy strain on the emergency preparedness sys-
tems of the Arctic countries. This study focuses on the need for competencies related 
to large-scale Search and Rescue operations (SAR operations) amongst the shipping 
companies, vessels and governments involved. A SAR operation is the activity 
related to finding and rescuing people in distress. Several international standards, in 
particular the conventions by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), pro-
vide direction for education and training of seafarers and rescue staff. This study 
elaborates on the operational competence requirements for key personnel involved 
in large scale SAR operations. Findings from real SAR incidents and exercises pro-
vide in-depth understanding on the operational challenges. The chapter gives direc-
tions for competence programs, beyond obligatory international standards, and 
recommendations for further research.
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The Arctic maritime regions are characterized by unique and challenging conditions 
including harsh weather, cold climate, remoteness from harbors and other infra-
structure, and a vulnerable environment (Borch and Batalden 2015; Gudmestad 
et  al. 1999; Løset et  al. 1999). Incidents involving vessels with many people on 
board are among the most challenging emergencies to prepare for and to prevent 
(Ho 2010; Marchenko et al. 2015; Lasserre and Pelletier 2011).
Regional authorities in several Arctic areas including the Northern Sea Route, the 
North West Passage, and the Spitsbergen region may experience severe capacity and 
competence challenges in case of an accident involving passenger ships, due to the 
larger passenger numbers on the vessels and the limited resources available (Arctic 
Council 2009; Johnston et al. 2012; Roud et al. 2016). An emergency on a cruise 
ship may have severe consequences (Lois et al. 2004; Vanem and Skjong 2004) as 
highlighted in the Costa Concordia accident. Several related key challenges may 
emerge including SAR, fire-fighting, oil recovery operations and vessel salvage.
Regulations such as the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
(Polar Code) may reduce the probability of large scale accidents and increase prepared-
ness on board the vessels (Jensen 2016; Bai 2015). Governments may demand special 
competence and pilots onboard, and also restrict access to challenging sea regions.
However, there is a risk for severe accidents (Marchenko et al. 2015). Regional 
studies have shown limitations in SAR capacities, including the SAR technology 
adapted to the region. This includes information and communication tools for 
remote areas such as Single Window (Fjortoft et al. 2011), innovation in Arctic ves-
sel and rescue equipment (Berg et  al. 2013; Gudmestad and Karunakaran 2012; 
Torheim and Gudmestad 2011) and development of Arctic infrastructure (Dodds 
2013). There is a need for operational knowledge, especially on cooperation among 
the broad range of actors involved in major accidents, including the crew of the ves-
sel in distress, joint rescue coordination centers (JRCC), coast guard, private pre-
paredness organizations, Samaritan vessels, police, the ship owners and their 
stakeholders (Borch and Andreassen 2015).
Differences in organization and management principles of stakeholders within 
emergency networks may hamper partnership and cooperation across institutions 
and borders. Recently, the Incident Command System (ICS) has gained importance 
in the response management structure of Arctic states such as the USA, Canada and 
Norway (Bigley and Roberts 2001). However, other actors such as the NATO mili-
tary organizations apply other systems with a different management structure. For 
example, in Norway the police and the military apply their management structure, 
while the fire and rescue brigades and oil recovery authorities have introduced ICS 
into their operations (The Roksund Government Committee 2016).
In this respect, there is a need to look closer into the actual roles and positions of 
operators along the SAR value chain. As an example, the supportive organization 
and the competence of the on-scene commanders have not been thoroughly studied 
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in the context of Arctic remoteness and mass rescue scenarios (Borch and Andreassen 
2015; Małyszko and Wielgosz 2016).
This chapter discusses how the competence of key Arctic maritime SAR person-
nel needs to be developed in order to manage incidents involving multiple emer-
gency services with different modes of operation. Competence requirements are 
elaborated upon, both at the operational coordination and command level as well as 
at the local on-scene tactical level.
Only a few studies have focused on the role of maritime SAR-leaders. Crichton 
et al. (2005) reflect on incident command skills on oil platforms with respect to the 
five categories of situational awareness, decision-making, teamwork, leadership 
and communication. Borch and Andreassen (2015) emphasize the roles of emer-
gency preparedness managers.
Creating common situational awareness is the critical first part of any SAR oper-
ation. Knowing what is going on is one of the key prerequisites in crisis response 
(Oomes 2004; Endsley and Garland 2000). However, areas like the Arctic are prone 
to limited information and situational awareness due to limited communication 
facilities (Behlke 2013), lack of vessels and equipment, as well as personnel (Berg 
et  al. 2013; Borch and Andreassen 2015; Rottem 2014). The capability to make 
decisions based on limited knowledge may improve through education. Klein 
(1993), Orasanu and Connolly (1993), Cosgrave (1996) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) claim that the ability to assess situations can be improved through practiced 
understanding – in other words exercises and training.
Decision making in a SAR value chain is a difficult command skill and character-
ized by uncertainty about the cause-consequence links, due to limited information 
and knowledge as to both context and SAR-tools available (Liu et al. 2014). One 
aspect, which is particularly highlighted in recognition-primed decision model and 
naturalistic decision-making (Liu et al. 2014), is the importance of previous events 
or training and exercises, which enforces the importance of having experienced and 
suitably trained decision makers. According to both the incident command approach 
by Crichton et al. (2005) and Managerial Roles by Mintzberg (2009), a broad range 
of leadership tasks plays a central role in managing demanding situations.
Due to the scale of a mass rescue operation compared with the lack of immediate 
resources available, close cooperation and teamwork amongst several organizations 
is needed. Trust between the organizations is important. Sako (1998) suggests that 
trust can be based on the trustee establishing competence, goodwill or contractual 
promise keeping. The trustor on the other hand becomes vulnerable to the trustee’s 
actions (see Wilson et al. 2007).
Specifically, contractual trust may include standard operation procedures (SOP) 
which frame teamwork (Ivanova 2011; Ivanova and Sydnes 2010; Sydnes and 
Sydnes 2013). A continuous information flow via SOPs may enable more efficient 
use of resources, coordination and lower risk of operations, possibly at all levels 
from the operational scene up to the national government level. Interpersonal com-
munication hereby plays a major role (Mintzberg 2009).
Finally, competence based on communication and communication systems is 
highly important and needs to be established prior to potential incidents (Crichton 
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et al. 2005; Kapucu et al. 2010). Communication may already be compulsory due to 
pre-existing control mechanisms (Mintzberg 2009). Yet, aspects such as lack of trust 
due to cultural or political reasons or different language, be it due to different stan-
dards in different institutions or different nationalities, may be critical aspects of 
communication (Comfort and Kapucu 2006; Kapucu 2005; Robinson et al. 2015). 
In a case study of a SAR-exercise focusing on shared situational awareness and 
communication, Seppänen et al. (2013) discovered that “information gaps, the lack 
of fluent communication, and the fact that there is no common operational picture” 
hamper emergency management.
SAR operations at sea are regulated by, among others, the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), International Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR)-Manuals 1–3 and the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). SOLAS includes the relevant 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS-Code). Additional regula-
tory framework includes the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) with the Manila amendments 
of 2010, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F), as well as other IMO con-
ventions with indirect relevance to SAR and standards by standardization societies. 
With respect to cross-boundary coordination and host nation support (HNS) the 
United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and regional and bilateral agreements on 
responsibility, rights and exercises are important.
A study by Ghosh and Rubly (2015) supports the importance of the Polar Code, 
pointing out that emergency management personnel including the on-scene staff 
such as captains, officers and crew, need to understand and be able to handle poten-
tial hazards and risks. Sander et al. (2015) point out the need for further regulations. 
Even though the Polar Code provides regulations to a certain extent, Jensen (2016) 
questions the potential power of the Polar Code due to its openness to national inter-
pretation with regard to implementation standards.
The IAMSAR Manuals define the on-scene coordinator (OSC) as the most capa-
ble and trained leading person on site (IMO 2016). According to Rake and Njå 
(2009), the OSC needs to be well-rendered, aware of the situation, a good commu-
nicator, quick at information processing, a quick decision maker and swift at impro-
vising. The OSC has to be clear, available, cooperative and lead with authority. Also 
the OSC has to have best suitable equipment and support from the JRCC (see 
Małyszko and Wielgosz 2016; Ansell et al. 2010).
The IAMSAR manuals of 2016 for the first time also establish the Aircraft 
Coordinator (ACO) in an equally important manner as the OSC (IMO 2016). The 
ACO should maintain high flight safety, advise and support as well as increase 
effectiveness of the operation (Ibid; USCG 2010). Few systematic studies related to 
marine ACO competence have been found.
A facilitating Command System is also essential for successful emergency 
response. It is traditionally structured hierarchically and has clear command and con-
trol agreements (Owen et al. 2015). Particularly ICS are designed for large-scale oper-
ations and support coordination, flow of information, best possible use for on- scene 
personnel and timely decision making (Rimstad et al. 2014; Boersma et al. 2014).
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Rimstad et al. (2014) claim that crises should be managed at the lowest possible 
level, procedures should be every day procedures, and both public and private actors 
should jointly provide all resources available. Yet, there is a need for mission com-
manders to coordinate and facilitate cooperation beyond organizations and borders 
(Politidirektoratet 2011). Christensen et al. (2012) show that information flow and 
mobilization should run as automatically and efficiently as possible and observe 
increased vertical information flows within an organization, before information is 
shared horizontally.
By keeping the complexity and uncertainty of Arctic maritime emergency opera-
tions in mind, there is a special challenge related to the role of the emergency sys-
tem managers and their command structure. There is a need to develop a look into 
criteria for relevant command skills and competences for on-scene personnel and 
the command system, and to find the tools needed for education and training of key 
personnel along the whole SAR-value chain.
25.2  Methods
This study followed an in-depth, qualitative research strategy focusing on command 
structures, managerial roles and the emergency management competence needs. 
Illustrative cases were chosen to highlight the complexity and challenges of SAR 
operations in Arctic waters.
Data were collected from observations both on full scale and table top exercises 
(TTX). The observational studies were followed up by unstructured interviews with 
key personnel after the SAR exercises. In addition, a combination of interviews, 
studies of logs and investigation reports from major accidents were included.
The study follows up on eleven cases (Table 25.1) taken from a larger research 
initiative with 27 cases. Both domestic and international exercises were included in 
the study to emphasize the challenges in organizational- and cross-border coopera-
tion. Related standards and regulations in the Arctic were reviewed and reflected 
upon according to data from exercise observations. In the analysis, the data from 
exercises and incidents were screened on competence gaps and challenges in order 
to determine further necessary activity to develop relevant command skills and 
competences for on-scene personnel and the command system.
25.3  Results and Discussion
In a mass rescue operation the number of persons in the water, in rafts and in life 
boats may be overwhelming. There may also still be people on board the vessel in 
distress. Real incidents like the Maxim Gorkiy collision with ice in the Spitsbergen 
region and the Costa Concordia grounding in Italy showed that a major challenge in 
mass rescue incidents is to perform “vessel or rescue unit triage” i.e. prioritize who 
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to rescue based on limited information. This is especially a challenge for on-scene 
personnel. It also lays a heavy burden on the mission coordinator at the JRCC, who 
may experience challenges to allocate adequate resources fast enough.
In the Arctic, helicopter resources may play a vital role especially in an early 
phase. The Air Coordinator role is also reported to become more demanding in mass 
rescue incidents and needs further exercise and training with respect to the IAMSAR 
manuals (see IMO 2016). Exercise Nord and Arctic SAR indicated that airborne 
professionals and SAR non-professional captains, officers and masters are often 
first on-site and therefore need to be well-educated for the OSC-role (see Klein 
1993; Orasanu and Connolly 1993; Cosgrave 1996; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986).
Therefore, more specific training and development for potential ACOs and OSCs 
is in demand. In the TTX KV Sortland it was discussed to assign this task to a per-
son that could also fill the figurehead-role, as described by Mintzberg (2009).
The importance of crew situational awareness, spontaneous adaptation to 
changes and knowledge on procedures, standards and automated processes were 
highlighted by the reports of the Costa Concordia incident. In this case, crew train-
Table 25.1 List of exercises and incidents presented in this study
Name Exercise/incident/other Year Month Place Documents
Maxim 
Gorkiy





Incident 2012 January Italy Report
KV SAR 
2016
Newsletter on exercises 
and incidents




Full scale exercise 2015 September Finland Observation
Exercise 
Barents









Full scale exercise 2015/16 April Norway Log book
TTX KV 
Sortland
Table top exercise 2016 April Norway Brief, log-book
SARex Full scale exercise 
about Polar Code













Table top exercise 2016 April Iceland Report, 
observation
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ing on passenger management would have been particularly beneficial to prevent 
casualties. The Polar Code’s chapter “Manning and Training” discusses these tasks, 
albeit on a rather general level. As a consequence, the IMO is working on stricter 
procedures in this respect.
For the master of the distress vessel and the on-scene coordinator, knowledge gath-
ering and operational planning for the steps ahead including improvisation was 
important, but seldom trained at a realistic scale (source: Exercise SARex and 
Exercise Nord). Periodic dialogue and data sharing as well as training with the SAR 
operators and the JRCC on resource allocation and priorities are critical in this respect.
Experience from Exercise Barents 2015 showed that in some cases, difficult 
political situations or heavily bureaucratic bilateral cooperation is reducing the 
effects of the exercise. Knowledge and testing of the underlying Arctic SAR control 
mechanisms are recommended for improvement. Further efforts to increase aware-
ness and competence in the command system in terms of cross border cooperation 
and HNS may include a “written brief on the structure of the host nation’s com-
mand system”, as recommended from the Barents Rescue exercise 2015.
Preparation of ships before they go to the Arctic may help captains in case of 
emergencies. Not the least, the importance of fast alarm is central. The Costa 
Concordia and Maxim Gorkiy incidents are two examples where alarms came more 
than an hour after the accident. Furthermore, harbors and their crew need to adapt 
to increased ship sizes and activities and be prepared for taking care of a large num-
ber of rescued persons (Haugen and Fjortoft 2011). Decision support systems, as 
suggested by Małyszko and Wielgosz (2016), may help to determine methods for 
managing all these data and make decisions under uncertainty. Also, the establish-
ment and preparation of action plans helped both the OSC as well as the whole 
command system to perform efficiently (Report from Exercise Helgeland on oil 
spill recovery).
In this respect, it is vital to know and efficiently communicate where the respon-
sibilities of each person (OSC, ACO, Captain, Samaritan Vessels, etc.) start and end. 
Taking care of OSC responsibilities may demand several persons, and how to 
choose them is not elaborated upon in the IAMSAR manuals (IAMSAR Volume II). 
Actors should be aware of differences and regulations of the control mechanisms 
and, in turn, commit to trust, as outlined by Sako (1998).
Regardless of the field of research, researchers agree on the importance of trust 
in social interaction (Rousseau et al. 1998). Data from domestic exercises and the 
AECO SAR workshop showed that those who had developed relations prior to the 
actual emergency response through daily collaboration had built trust, and thus 
experienced fewer challenges in organizational collaboration on complex tasks. 
This includes willingness to collaborate, information sharing and shared values or 
standards (see Kapucu 2006).
Preparedness of the vessel’s communication lines and competence in use is cru-
cial. Connection capacities may be limited in the Arctic, as discussed previously, 
causing decision-making under ambiguity (Behlke 2013). Preparations and instal-
lations before a cruise journey (e.g., via Polar Water Operational Manual), includ-
ing actual learning from the experiences of previous cruises is therefore important. 
25 Maritime Operations and Emergency Preparedness in the Arctic–Competence…
252
In order to support communication, chat systems and shared written communica-
tion logs have proven to be an efficient tool for command systems to overcome 
misunderstandings resulting from oral communication. However, as was indicated 
in the Norwegian Coast Guard SAR info KV 2016, it is at times still problematic 
with different chat-programs, different cultures and un-coordinated systems, espe-
cially in terms of larger incidents including several command structures or cross-
border response. More communication capacity has therefore been requested during 
exercises between the OSC and HNS resources.
25.4  Conclusions
The objective of this study was to provide insights into the roles of the emergency 
command system. Arctic SAR operations and especially mass rescue operations are 
very complex and require enhanced experience from the key personnel. The Polar 
Code will contribute to increased crew and operator knowledge on the unique con-
ditions of the Polar regions, including what is needed as to safety training and man-
ning for emergency situations. Efficient communication and close interaction 
between the vessel in distress, the OSCs and the SAR mission coordinators are vital, 
and should be emphasized in all procedures.
This study has shown that exercises are often too limited in scale and scope and 
do not illuminate the full range of challenges related to mass rescue operations in 
the Arctic. Advanced OSC courses should be available for a broader spectrum of 
personnel including the masters and officers of all vessels in Polar regions who are 
often the first on site. For vessel captains, additional course modules in the Global 
Maritime Distress and Safety System course on OSC/ACO-air coordinator roles in 
the Arctic need to be developed as well as integrated in the Polar water operation 
manuals and contingency plans. This is particularly important for the crew of large 
passenger vessels operating in remote areas.
The results of this study indicate that immediate alarm notification and creation 
of a common situational awareness are key issues induced by the operational knowl-
edge. In mass rescue incidents the leading personnel both on board and on shore, 
including the OSC, ACO, SAR mission coordinator and staff need to be aware of the 
capabilities and capacities that may be mobilized in different phases of the emer-
gency. More efforts towards competence sharing are recommended in all stages of 
the SAR value chain. The operators on different levels need in-depth education on 
decision making under uncertainty, teamwork and leadership. Cross-institutional 
cooperation in education may help to pinpoint the bottlenecks within the command 
systems and reveal opportunities on how to integrate different systems.
Further studies on the coordination of cross-institutional cooperation, manage-
rial roles, competence sharing and the trust aspect may contribute to increased effi-
ciency in joint actions within the Arctic SAR value chain.
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